In 1999, UNESCO published a short book, intended for a general audience, comparing the careers of Martin Luther King, Jr., and Mohandas K. Gandhi and noting the obvious parallels in their use of nonviolence. Four years later, the Motilal Bhimraj Charity Trust put out a similar book, also comparing black politics to Indian politics, although with one major difference. Instead of casting Gandhi as the Indian analogue to King, as UNESCO had done, it cast B. R. Ambedkar, a leader of untouchables and one of Gandhi's most formidable opponents.
The history of these two visions, in the United States and in India, reveals important complications in the effort of anti-racists in the U.S. to achieve their political goals. Recent scholarship has taken important steps toward an appreciation of these complexities. In the past fifteen years Paul Gilroy, Penny M. Von Eschen, Sudarshan Kapur, Brenda Gayle Plummer, Robin D. G. Kelley, Vijay Prashad, and Nikhil Pal Singh, among others, have demonstrated beyond refutation the persistence and centrality of internationalism in U.S. black thought. The stock story about King reaching blindly across the world to find a sympathetic soul in Gandhi has rightly been pushed aside in favor of a richer account of a longstanding, though not always prominent, dialogue between Indians and U.S.
blacks running throughout the course of the twentieth century.
But although the recognition of internationalism in recent studies has added vital themes and characters to the study of black history, it has yet to fully draw them into focus. There remains a tendency, in discussion of internationalism of any sort, to romanticize the mere presence of transnational connections and to decline to make any more than general comments on their significance.
With respect to India, we now know quite a lot about the numerous moments of contact between Indians and blacks, but have few conceptual categories through which to understand them. This lack is particularly unfortunate because, as I will argue, the desire throughout the twentieth century to analogize blacks in the U.S. to Indians has not been all of a piece but deeply divided. Thinkers in both countries have disagreed, sometimes passionately, over whether being black is like being colonized or like being untouchable. Once we distinguish between these two strains of the black-Indian analogy, we see not only moments of mutual inspiration between U.S. black politics and Indian politics, but moments of bitter contention as well.
The place to start is with the concept of "caste." As a category of analysis, caste has been more fluid than most. Nevertheless, despite its long history of semantic shifts, a tradition of European social theory and colonial administrative practice-stretching from the early nineteenth century until at least the late 1960s and including such varied thinkers as G. W. F. Hegel, Max Weber, and Louis Dumont-has cemented a basic notion of caste as the foundational element of an unchanging, non-voluntarist, and hierarchal social system in India. 2 In distinction to class, the archetypal form of European social organization, caste has traditionally been taken as a marker of a refusal or inability to engage with the forces of history. Although, for obvious reasons, theorizations of caste have historically been centered in Europe, they have had a specific relevance in the United States, where the themes of progress, individualism, and equality have animated national political discussions.
Caste first entered U.S. debates in the antebellum period, when abolitionists began to describe slavery as a threat to the country's core values. Although never central to abolitionist analysis, "caste" became at least a familiar locution, appearing on the front page of the Liberator's first issue, in the titles of two abolitionist books, and in the writings and speeches of such prominent opponents of slavery as Frederick Douglass, William Lloyd Garrison, Horace Greeley, Harriet Beecher Stowe, William Seward, Gerrit Smith, Charles Sumner, Theodore Parker, and Cassius Clay. Its appeal was multiple. Most importantly, by invoking missionary accounts of India-of which there were many in antebellum journals-the caste comparison highlighted the atavistic and anti-republican aspects of racial hierarchies. Segregated churches, with their close ties to the mission field, proved especially vulnerable to the accusation that they were harboring the insidious caste spirit. "Caste," had the added virtue of allowing abolitionists to damn Southern slavery and Northern racism in a single breath. And because it avoided mention of race, it allowed abolitionists to insist on the biological unity of the human species. Abolitionists were not the only thinkers to see important similarities between race in the U.S. and caste in India. Anti-caste activists in India, from very early on, arrived at similar conclusions.
Jotirao Phule, a lower-caste reformer traditionally taken to be the foundational modern anti-casteist, first took an interest in the United States in the late 1840s, when Brahman nationalists gave him a book by Thomas Paine. Although the Brahmans intended the young student to take from Paine's writings the message that Indians of all castes must unite to throw off British rule, Phule instead recognized in Paine the possibility of a more radical response to Indian society. 4 While abolitionists had come to see caste as a threat to republicanism, Phule came to the complementary conclusion: that republicanism was a threat to caste. Acknowledging the connection, Phule titled his major anti-Brahman polemic Slavery (1873) and dedicated it to the people of the United States "as a token of admiration for their sublime disinterested and selfsacrificing [sic] devotion in the cause of Negro Slavery." 5 By allying his cause with that of the abolitionists, Phule hoped to benefit from their international standing and successful rhetoric. Not surprisingly, Phule read Uncle Tom's Cabin with great enthusiasm. "Anyone who reads this book," he wrote, "will have to cry with shame in public like the Marwadi women drawing the pallu of their saree over their heads and will have to sigh and sob." 6 One of Phule's sponsors, Sayajirao Gayakavad, the Maharaja of Baroda, shared Phule's interest in the United States. Having visited Chicago during the 1893 Columbian Exposition, the impressed Maharaja brought back some educators and librarians with him to Baroda, where they prepared a U.S.-centered curriculum. "Because the textbooks, in Gujarati and Marathi as well as in English, had been prepared by American educators," explained a former pupil, "students in the elemen- In his energetic skewering of the caste system, Ambedkar compared caste repeatedly to slavery, which he came to understand not only as an affront to human dignity, but particularly as an obstacle to a vibrant society based on liberty and equality. "An ideal society," he wrote in 1937, echoing his mentor, "should be mobile, should be full of channels for conveying a change taking place in one part to other parts. In an ideal society there should be many interests consciously communicated and shared. They should be varied and free points of contact with other modes of association." This sort of mobility, he continued, could develop only in a society that obeyed the "rough and ready rule" of treating all citizens alike.
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In this reading, untouchability and slavery were linked in their hostility to democracy, and blacks and untouchables were linked by a shared social status.
"There is so much similarity between the position of the Untouchables and the position of the Negroes of America," he explained to W. E. B. Du Bois in a letter, "that the study of the latter is not only natural but necessary." 10 Accordingly, Ambedkar turned throughout his career to U.S. history- 13 But although Mayo undeniably struck a chord-Mother India provoked over fifty books and pamphlets in reply and sold almost 400,000 copies through its U.S. publisher alone by the 1950s-she was unsuccessful in winning opinion-setters like Villard to her side. 14 As Mrinalini Sinha has shown, Mayo inadvertently set off a powder keg of international response, which, among progressives in the United States, tended to shore up support for Indian nationalism and undermine Mayo's own position. 15 Mayo's book may not have won her as many admirers as she had hoped, but she did succeed overwhelmingly in drawing attention to India and its institutions. One consequence of this interest in India was the rise, in the 1930s, of the "caste school of race relations" within the social sciences.
In 1936, W. Lloyd Warner launched the caste school with a four-page article in the American Journal of Sociology. 16 There, Warner argued that the meritocratic class system in the Deep South had been violently distorted by the presence of a caste system, which deprived blacks of occupational, social, and educational opportunities, to the point where middle-class whites enjoyed greater social advantages than black elites. The short paper made no mention of India; the concept of caste, on paper at least, merely signified an unequal arrangement of persons into groups in which intermarriage and inter-group mobility were both forbidden. And yet, caste for Warner and his followers was never entirely a descriptive matter; it was also a moral one. On the one hand, by substituting "caste" for "race," member's of Warner's school, like the abolitionists before them, emphasized the lack of biological grounding for racism.
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On the other, by choosing the word caste, they added a whiff of missionary zeal to their analysis. In the aftermath of Mother India, the mere assertion that there was a caste system in the United States-regardless of how it worked or what it looked like-was already a claim loaded with ethical valence. logical data on black life in the United States was expressed in terms of caste. It was thus natural that Myrdal, too, should take up the Warner thesis. In his An American Dilemma, Myrdal referred frequently to a "caste system," arguing that a class-based vision-the sort used to analyze European societies-was "inapplicable" to the United States because of the "traversing systems of color caste."
The concept of "caste struggle," he thought, was "much more realistic" for the U.S. than the Marxian notion of class struggle. Not all social scientists accepted the race-caste analogy, and none opposed it with greater force than Oliver C. Cox, E. Franklin Frazier, and Charles S. Johnson, the three most important black sociologists in the country after Du Bois. The problem with caste, as Frazier put it, was that it was "essentially static" and "failed to provide an orientation for the dynamic aspects of race relations."
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Comparing caste to race, they objected, reified racism as a timeless tradition based in compliance rather than a changing and contested form of oppression maintained by force. Cox, who believed racism to be the consequence of capitalism rather than of innate human wickedness, took especially strong umbrage at caste-school moralizing and, in an admirable fit of scholarly rage, read up on Indian caste in an attempt to sever the race-caste link. Cox's research, however, was lamentably incomplete. He focused on anthropology to the exclusion of modern politics and accepted too read- ily the scholarship of apologists for empire. As a result, Cox took caste to be, if not ahistorical, than at least unshakeable. "Race conflict is directed against or toward the maintenance of the entire order of the races," he wrote. "On the other hand, caste rivalry never brings the caste system into ques- At a time when black citizenship was imperiled and struggles for home rule began to achieve worldwide recognition, it did not take any large stretch of the imagination for black intellectuals to see themselves as part of the colonized world. 25 In this regard, India, the world's largest colony and the one most likely to achieve independence, carried a particular salience for black internationalists such as Du Bois, Marcus Garvey, and Paul Robeson. States. Lajpat Rai explained that he chose the U.S. for his destination because he hoped to "study the Negro problem on the spot." To this end, he acquainted himself thoroughly with black politics, befriending such luminaries as Du Bois, Garvey, and Booker T. Washington. Although he had initially identified blacks with untouchables, as the nationalist movement gained momentum he emphasized the colonial connection instead. In his view, Indians and blacks stood united in the fight against "white imperialism," which could take either the form of domestic racism or the subjugation of foreign nations. In either case, it was "the greatest world menace known to history," compared to which "the caste cruelties of India" were relatively unimportant. peated calls for a "black Gandhi" to mobilize resistance to white racism. But as Penny M. Von Eschen has observed, the Gandhi that black internationalists wanted-a fierce and charismatic anti-imperialist-was not the Christlike pacifist whose image came to dominate the U.S. press in subsequent decades.
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To understand how the language of empire came to trump the language of caste and how Gandhi the moral leader displaced Gandhi the militant activist, we must turn to a far-distant set of thinkers: liberal Protestant missionaries within India. By accepting that Christianity in India might appear in different guise than in the West, Jones hinted at a possibility that was to become ever more tantalizing in the following decades: that the Christ of the Indian road might not be a Christ at all but, rather, a Mahatma. The great irony of India for Jones was that "one of the most Christlike men in history" turned out to be none other than the devout Hindu Mohandas K. Gandhi. Liberal missionaries were not the staunch critics of imperialism and racism that their contemporaries, the black internationalists, were, but neither were they insincere. It was in fact C. F. Andrews who convinced Benjamin E.
Mays, the young dean of Howard University's School of Religion, that the British empire was founded upon racism. 38 Caste, formerly a central preoccupation of Christian missionaries in India, fit awkwardly with this new approach to missionizing. Since the 1860s, Christian missionaries in India had targeted lower-caste Indians, who had much to gain from leaving Hinduism and entering the church's care.
Jones's embrace of Indian culture, however, meant a redirection of this attention toward Indian intellectuals, whom, he hoped, would oversee the indigenization of Christianity. ernments.
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In the eyes of worried nationalists, Ambedkar's skepticism threatened to divide the nascent nation and undermine the independence movement.
On the other side, the committed nationalist Gandhi was ambivalent in his support for untouchables. Much has been made of Gandhi's adoption of an untouchable girl into his household, of his coining the word "Harijans" (children of God) in reference to untouchables, and of his campaign against untouchability after 1932. But it must be remembered that, for Gandhi, the war against em- To wage-earning untouchables, he preached the "gospel of industrial education" and pointed to the model of Booker T. Washington, "one of the great men of 41 Ibid., 177. Ambedkar continued the analogy later in the book by describing Gandhi as Lincoln-unwilling to emancipate the slaves if doing so meant destroying the Union (282). But while Lincoln was willing to emancipate the slaves in order to win the war, Gandhi, Ambedkar argued, was not even willing to do this. He would "let Swaraj perish if the cost of it is the political freedom of the Untouchables" (283 Gandhi's lifelong fascination with Washington and his proclaimed goal of "producing from among the Harijans a prototype of Booker T. Washington" was the only hint Gandhi made of a parallel between the plight of U.S. blacks and that of untouchables.
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At other times, he insisted that "there can be no true comparison between the two," preferring instead to focus on the similarities between black liberation and his own nationalist struggle.
47
Gandhi's hope for quietism on the part of untouchables was accompanied by a grim view of their capacities as political actors. "The poor Harijans have no mind, no intelligence, no sense of difference between God and not God," he explained to an aghast C. F. Andrews. To think that they could act as a group would be "absurd."
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To the missionary John R. Mott, Gandhi insisted that untouchables lacked "the mind and intelligence to understand what you talked" and thus could never be the subjects of genuine conversion. "Would you preach the Gospel to a cow?" he asked. 49 Pessimistic about any possibility for real political action on the part of the untouchables, Gandhi denied that Ambedkar, an outspoken radical with an Ivy-league education, could ever represent them. For Gandhi, it was the saint in the loincloth, not the lawyer in jacket and tie, who must speak for the downtrodden people of India. Despite having been born into the bania caste, Gandhi insisted that he was "an 'untouchable' by adoption" and therefore "more of an 'untouchable'" than Ambedkar, who was merely untouchable by birth. This arrangement would last for twenty years, at which point the untouchables' separate electorate would be dissolved and they would become ordinary Hindu voters.
Gandhi opposed MacDonald's solution vehemently, declaring that he would "fast unto death" were MacDonald to press forward with it. MacDonald refused to yield, and Gandhi began his promised fast on September 20. "Gandhi was immolating one person, himself, to prevent the dismemberment of Indian society," observed the poet Rabindranath Tagore.
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What followed was an all-India race to wring concessions from Ambedkar in order to save the Mahatma's life. "It was a baffling situation," reflected Ambedkar. "There was before me the duty, which I owed as a part of common humanity, to save Gandhi from sure death. There was before me the problem of saving for the Untouchables the political rights which the Prime Minister had given them. I responded to the call of humanity." 53 The result of Ambedkar's eleventh-hour concession was the Poona Pact: an 51 Ibid., 7. 52 Tagore, quoted in Fischer, Life of Gandhi, 312. 53 Ambedkar, Congress and Gandhi, 88. agreement that increased the number of electoral seats reserved for untouchables while doing away with the protection of separate constituencies. After some hasty diplomacy in England by C. F. Andrews, MacDonald accepted the compromise and it was written into the Government of India Act of 1935.
Gandhi's fast brought the Mahatma uncomfortably close to death's door, and the image of Gandhi's life and the fate of the untouchables hanging perilously in the balance proved too dramatic to be ignored. For followers of both leaders, the fast became a pivotal and symbolic event in Indian history-Gandhians seeing it as Gandhi's great sacrifice for untouchables and Ambedkarites regarding it as his great betrayal. But when it came to exporting their account of the fast, Ambedkar and his fellow-thinkers were at a decided disadvantage. Whereas items from Gandhi's newspaper Harijan were occasionally reprinted in U.S. periodicals, untouchables had no such organ themselves and few means of influencing public opinion abroad. Katherine Mayo rallied for Ambedkar, declaring Gandhi to be "the faithful lieutenant of the Hindu oligarch, the Hindu plutocrat, the Hindu slave-master," but she found few supporters.
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Liberal opinion-setters in the United States, having declared their allegiance to Indian nationalism, were unwilling to delve into caste politics. Gandhi's opposition to separate electorates for untouchables had become, in the eyes of his apostles, a fast against untouchability itself.
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After his fast, Gandhi did campaign tirelessly to change the attitudes of his fellow Hindus toward untouchability. In this, he achieved some measure of success. By lashing caste reform to the independence movement, Gandhi drew international attention to untouchability and forced caste Hindus to confront the issue. Untouchables, however, continued to experience overwhelming deprivations in the areas of civil rights, education, employment, and the use of public facilities. Unwilling to alienate Hindus from the nationalist cause and skeptical of any reforms won by coercion, Gandhi could touch upon these problems only lightly. He preferred charitable remedies to legal ones and focused his campaigns on symbolic issues such as temple entry and intermarriage rather than structural ones. in which the white race lives is changing"-a statement that Willkie's opponent in the 1940 presidential election, the ardently anti-imperialist Franklin Delano Roosevelt, would not have disputed. 61 For India, all of this meant that liberals were far more interested in nationalists like Gandhi than in critics of Indian institutions like Ambedkar, who, to his chagrin, found more supporters among apologists for empire like Mayo than among progressives.
Building on the sympathy that black internationalists and liberal Protestant missionaries generated for Indian nationalism, Gandhians undertook a large-scale project to introduce Gandhism into the United States, particularly into black life. Here, the Indian side of things must be stressed, because for every eager importer of nonviolence in the United States, there was an equally eager exporter in India, often acting on Gandhi's own instructions. Although Gandhi never visited the United States himself, he maintained an interest in race relations there and was keen to spread his message westward. When Howard Thurman, on leave from Howard University, came to visit India on the invitation of one of Gandhi's many traveling ambassadors, Gandhi sent Thurman a telegram saying that if the theologian could not come to Gandhi's ashram in Bardoli, then Gandhi would gladly travel to Bombay to meet him. When Thurman arrived in Bardoli, Gandhi came out to greet his car. "This is the first time in all the years that we have been working together that I've ever seen him come out to greet a visitor so warmly," Gandhi's secretary explained to Thurman.
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Gandhi rapidly pumped Thurman and his party for information about blacks in the United States, asking about voting rights, lynchings, discrimination, and slavery. As their time ran out, Gandhi asked Thurman's wife Sue to sing a spiritual, and he left the party with his prediction that "it may be through the Negroes that the unadulterated message of nonviolence will be delivered to the world." you in every way that is indescribably real and deep," Andrews reported to Gandhi. 65 was no more than a technique; "moral jiu-jitsu" for Gregg and "nonviolent direct action" for Shridharani. This focus on the technical aspects of nonviolence mirrored a similar trend in India, where Gandhi himself, acknowledging that not all nationalist leaders shared fully in his idiosyncratic religious beliefs, presented nonviolence "as a political weapon to be employed for the solution of practical problems." 67 On the other end, an alliance of black colleges and predominantly white Christian and pacifist organizations cooperated to deliver Gandhi's message to black scholars and activists. Both also came to identify closely with the untouchables they saw during their travels.
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These slight detours did not distort the greater message, however, and Mays, Thurman, Rustin, and Nelson all became, as hoped, staunch advocates of the nonviolent cause.
By the time Martin Luther King, Jr., came to be interested in nonviolence, Gandhians throughout the United States were ready to deliver the message that had been years in the making.
As the story is frequently told, King probably first learned of Gandhi through Benjamin Mays, whom King described as "one of the great influences in my life," and who no doubt spoke frequent- In short, Gandhians knew to make the most of King's trip, and intended it to be a sort of Gandhian boot camp.
The journey itself got off to a rocky start. Scheduled to land in Delhi, India's capital, where Congress ruled, King's party missed a connecting flight from Zurich and were forced to instead take a later flight to Bombay, the capital of Maharashtra, Ambedkar's home state. There, a very different sight greeted them than the planned welcoming party of five hundred well-wishers bearing garlands. "I will never forget it, that night," King later preached, telling a story that he would find himself repeating often. "We got up early in the morning to take a plane for Delhi. And as we rode out of the airport we looked out on the street and saw people sleeping out on the sidewalks and out in the streets, and everywhere we went to. Walk through the train station, and you can't hardly get to the train, because people are sleeping on the platforms of the train station." 77 Coretta Scott King also remembered it well. "We were appalled. When we asked why hundreds and thousands of people were stretched out on the dirty pavements, we were told that they had no other place to sleep: they had no homes. . . . It was very hard for us to understand or accept this." 81 Upon his return to the United States, King's views on the subcontinent shifted. Now, India was not only the land that threw off the British through civil disobedience, but also the greatest extant example of a country that fought poverty and discrimination through massive state intervention.
As Reddick put it, the trip "made him see that 'Love' alone will not cure poverty and degradation." 82 Untouchability, which had formerly interested King only insomuch as it figured into Gandhian myth, quickly rose in King's estimation to become India's central problem. Less than a month after his return, King asked William Stuart Nelson to send him some books or pamphlets on the subject, claiming that he was "in the process of making a study of untouchability" and needed material. 83 Whether he read the books Nelson sent or not, the importance of India and untouchability in King's later political and economic thought cannot be denied. In 1960, King demanded that the federal government "carry on an active program of propaganda to promote the idea of integration" and "seriously consider making federal funds available to do the tremendous job of lifting the standards of a people too long ignored by America's conscience." These ideas, he explained, were "based on some recent insights that I gained while traveling in India," where the government had not only made discrimination illegal but had spent "millions of dollars a year in scholarships, housing, and community development to lift the standards of the untouchables." 84 The next year, in another push to expand the government's scope, King again cited India, claiming that his trip had "revealed to me the vast opportunities open to a government determined to end discrimination." 85 Although there is no indi-cation that King was familiar with Ambedkar, his model for positive governmental action, which he advanced most forcefully in his planned Poor People's Campaign and Bill of Rights for the Disadvantaged, was the very model that Ambedkar had fought so hard to bring into existence-and that Gandhi had fought so hard against. 86 The most startling statement of King's new view on India came in a sermon that he delivered on the fourth of July, 1965. In it, King recalled visiting a school of ex-untouchables in Trivandrum, Kerala:
The principal introduced me and then as he came to the conclusion of his introduction, he says, "Young people, I would like to present to you a fellow untouchable from the United States of America." And for a moment I was a bit shocked and peeved that I would be referred to as an untouchable. . . . I started thinking about the fact: twenty million of my brothers and sisters were still smothering in an airtight cage of poverty in an affluent society. I started thinking about the fact: these twenty million brothers and sisters were still by and large housed in rat-infested, unendurable slums in the big cities of our nation, still attending inadequate schools faced with improper recreational facilities. And I said to myself, "Yes, I am an untouchable, and every Negro in the United States of America is an untouchable." 87 This anecdote, replacing the race-colony analogy that had been foundational to the importation of Gandhism to the United States with the race-caste analogy, is all the more remarkable because it is very likely that it never happened to King. Benjamin E. Mays, King's mentor, told the following story of his own visit to a school in southern India:
When [the principal] introduced me he made it clear that I was a Christian, from Christian America; yet he emphasized at the same time that I was an "untouchable" in America-"an untouchable like us," he emphasized. I was dazed, puzzled, a bit peeved. But instantly I recognized that there was an element of truth in what he said. As long as Negroes are treated as second and third class citizens, whether in the North where segregation and discrimination are spreading, where Negroes are frequently denied the privileges of eating in restaurants and denied occupancy in hotels, where discrimination against them in employment and civic life is rampant; or whether in the South, where segregation and discrimina- Despite international mobilization (including in North America) and a hunger strike, the Dalit movement failed to win recognition at Durban. This failure may be taken as a symptom of the larger difficulty facing Dalits in pleading their case internationally. They find themselves up against a triumphalistic narrative of Indian history in which their struggle ended in 1947, with the nation's independence. And yet, even in this, they betray a striking resemblance to blacks in the U.S., who also face continued deprivation decades after a climactic official victory. In both countries, formal minority protections have come under attack from those who argue that social discrimination is a thing of the past. At the same time, both governments have largely failed to protect their black and Dalit citizens from poverty, from the inadequacies of the criminal justice system, and from environmental disasters resulting from Hurricane Katrina and the Narmada Dam. One wonders if the world's largest democracy and the world's most powerful democracy might still have something to learn from one another.
